Technology

Fake Claude Code update in Cursor's marketplace tried to plant an SSH backdoor key, up to 5,000 users hit

A tampered Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.313 build sat in the Cursor extension marketplace for about 11 hours on Oct. 29, 2026. Cursor says uninstalling it may not be enough.

AI-generated illustration: An alarmed young developer stares at a glowing puzzle-piece plug-in sliding into a laptop while a shadowy key and a thin tunnel of light snake out of the back of the machine
AI-generated illustration

TL;DR

  • A maliciously modified Anthropic.claude-code extension, version 2.1.313, was available in the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace between about 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. PT on Oct. 29, 2026, Cursor said.
  • Cursor says the build was not developed by Anthropic and that at most 5,000 users were affected.
  • The code collected host details, added an attacker SSH key labeled svc-telemetry and tried to open a persistent reverse SSH tunnel; due to errors in the code, enabling SSH failed on most macOS and Windows hosts.
  • Cursor removed the build, shut down and rebuilt the marketplace and rotated its keys; affected users should remove the key and persistence and rotate credentials.

The most trusted name in AI coding was the bait. For about 11 hours on Oct. 29, 2026, a maliciously modified version of Anthropic's Claude Code extension, Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.313, was available in the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace, Cursor said in a security notice.

"This malicious version of the extension was not developed by Anthropic," Cursor wrote. "At most 5,000 users were affected, and we will reach out directly." The Verge, citing Reuters, put the exposure window at 5:27 a.m. to 4:35 p.m. ET.

Cursor marketplace incident, Oct. 29, 2026 (PT)
~2:27 a.m.: tampered Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.313 becomes available; ~1:35 p.m.: exposure window ends; Marketplace shut down, keys rotated, marketplace rebuilt and back online; Attacker server taken offline with the hosting provider1~2:27 a.m.: tampered Anthropic.claude-code 2.1.313 becomes available2~1:35 p.m.: exposure window ends3Marketplace shut down, keys rotated, marketplace rebuilt and back online4Attacker server taken offline with the hosting provider
Source: Cursor

What the fake build did

According to Cursor, the code:

  • collected hostname, username, OS, architecture, home directory path, environment variable names, working directories, configured Git email and public IP;
  • tried to add an attacker-controlled SSH key, labeled svc-telemetry, to authorized_keys, enable the local SSH service and open a reverse SSH tunnel;
  • tried to make the tunnel persistent via a LaunchAgent on macOS or a scheduled task on Windows, with background scripts retrying roughly every 60 seconds;
  • reported host details to the attacker via HTTP POST.

Why most victims got lucky

Turning on the local SSH service requires admin rights, which the extension does not have on most macOS and Windows hosts, Cursor said. On those hosts that step fails and the attacker could not have logged in through the tunnel. Sophos X-Ops, citing analysis by Phorion, likewise said that due to coding errors SSH enablement fails on most macOS and Windows hosts.

But the extension still adds the attacker's key, installs persistence and sends host details. Cursor says the attacker server no longer functions after it worked with the hosting provider to take it offline.

What Cursor did, and what users must do

Cursor says it removed the version, blocked further distribution, shut down the marketplace, audited access and "confirmed no other extensions were tampered with", rotated its keys, rebuilt the marketplace and brought it back online. It has no evidence other versions or the official distribution are affected.

Anyone who installed or updated to 2.1.313 in the window should check authorized_keys for the svc-telemetry key, isolate affected hosts, run Cursor's remediation scripts and rotate credentials from a trusted system. "Uninstalling the extension may not be sufficient," Cursor warned, because the payload drops standalone persistence scripts. Sophos put it more bluntly: uninstalling leaves the backdoor in place.

What it means for Web3 teams – Analysis

Developer laptops hold the keys to deploy scripts, CI secrets, RPC credentials and sometimes hot-wallet signers. An AI coding extension runs with the same access as the developer. Treat extensions like dependencies: pin versions, disable auto-update on machines that touch signing keys, keep signing on separate hardware and rotate secrets after any marketplace incident. This is not investment advice.

FAQ

Which extension version was malicious?

Anthropic.claude-code version 2.1.313 distributed through the Cursor VS Code extension marketplace between about 2:27 a.m. and 1:35 p.m. PT on Oct. 29, 2026. Cursor says Anthropic did not develop it.

How many users were affected?

Cursor says at most 5,000 users were affected and that it will contact them directly.

Is uninstalling the extension enough?

No. Cursor says uninstalling may not be sufficient because the payload drops standalone persistence scripts. Users should remove the svc-telemetry SSH key, persistence and tunnel processes and rotate credentials.

Are other versions affected?

Cursor says it has no evidence that other versions of the extension or the official distribution are affected, and that no other extensions were tampered with.

Sources

  1. Cursor – Security notice: malicious version of Anthropic.claude-code (2.1.313) identified in the Cursor Extension Marketplace
  2. Sophos X-Ops – Malicious Claude Code extension distributed through Cursor marketplace
  3. The Verge – Cursor says around 5,000 people may have installed a malicious Claude Code extension

News summary based on the sources above. Not investment, legal or tax advice. Editorial policy & corrections · Report an error

Building in Web3? Turn the news into trust.

Positioning, KOL programs, LinkedIn systems and claim-safe content for Web3 and fintech teams.

Related

Book a free call